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TAx INCOME FROM CoPYRIGHT.-Plaintiff, a domestic business corporation, derived its income solely from copyrights granted by the
United States on motion picture films. These copyrights were not
all held in the name of the plaintiff corporation, but the latter owned
and received the income from all the copyrights. The State, in determining plaintiff's franchise tax, used the income derived from the
copyrights as a measure of the tax. Plaintiff sought to enjoin defendant from collecting the tax on the ground that a direct tax on
incomes from copyrights may not be levied by the State. On appeal
from a decree dismissing the petition, Hetd, affirmed. This nondiscriminatory tax is not directly on income but is purely an excise.
The copyright income was merely a casual incident in the determination of the franchise tax which directly imposes no burden on the
federal government. Educational Films Corporation of America v.
Hamilton Ward, Atty.-Gen. of N. Y., 51 Sup. Ct. 170 (1931).
For a discussion of this case in the Court of Appeals, see (1930)
5 St. John's L. Rev. 138.
W. H. S.

INCOME TAx-BASIS FOR DETERMINATION OF GAIN.-Petitioner, a manufacturer of metal castings, brought suit to recover income and excess profits taxes assessed and paid for the year 1917.
Right to recover was asserted on the sole ground that a munitions
tax levied under the Revenue Act of 1916,1 which became due and
was paid by petitioner in 1917 was correctly deducted from gross income in petitioner's tax returns for that year. Petitioner contends that
its returns were made as "cash receipts and disbursements" returns
under section 12 (a) and not under 13 (d), and that since by section 12 (a) taxes are required to be deducted only in the year when
2
paid, its munitions tax was rightly deducted in the 1917 return.
The Commissioner, rejecting this contention, deducted the tax from
gross income for 1916, the year when it accrued. and collected a
correspondingly increased income and profits tax for 1917, which
is involved in the present suit. On appeal from a decision in the
Circuit Court for the government, Held, affirmed. In computing
the Federal Income Tax the munitions manufacturer's tax for 1916
should have been deducted from 1916 income and not from 1917
income, although paid in the latter year, since the evidence indicated
the books and tax returns were made on the accrual basis. Aluminum
Casting Company v. Routzahn, 282 U. S. 92, 51 Sup. Ct. 11 (1930).
In the interpretation of statutes levying taxes it is the established rule not to extend their provisions, by implication, beyond the
Revenue Act of 1916 (c. 463, 39 Stat. 756, 780).

'Revenue Act of 1916 (c. 463, 39 Stat. 767, 771).

